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Previous studies on electoral competition show that fiscal variables are manipulated by 
incumbent politicians in order to be re-elected. This phenomenon has been addressed by the 
literature on electoral budget cycle and, in a decentralised economy, by the literature on 
yardstick competition. Our objective is to consider the effect of the introduction of a fiscal 
rule on the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians. We conduct a panel data 
analysis on the current expenditures of 246 Italian municipalities. The introduction of the 
domestic stability pact (DSP) seems to change the electoral cycle, by increasing the 
magnitude of the expenditures during pre-electoral periods. Moreover, our results show that 
municipalities affected by the DSP are more sensitive to changes in neighbouring 
jurisdictions’ fiscal policies, during pre-electoral periods. We conclude that the introduction 
of the DSP, besides significantly reducing the level of local public spending, strengthens the 
opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians in pre-electoral years. 
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The theoretical literature provides a rational explanation for the opportunistic
behaviour of incumbent politicians based on their desire to be re-elected. Ac-
cording to the electoral budget cycle (EBC) approach, the incumbent uses the
budget in order to inuence voters' opinion (Nordhaus, 1975; Rogo, 1990;
Besley and Case, 1995a). In a decentralised setting, the opportunistic be-
haviour is also related to yardstick competition, because citizens may compare
the performance of their incumbent politicians with the performance of politi-
cians in neighbouring jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995b).
Many studies have found empirical evidence of electoral budget cycle and
yardstick competition, both at the national and local level.1 However, only
few works have considered the eects of the introduction of scal rules on the
politicians' opportunistic behaviour.2 For instance, Mink and De Haan (2005)
show that the Stability and Growth Pact, imposed on EU Member States, does
not eliminate the electoral budget cycle, as governments tend to run decits
in the election year.
Our objective is to investigate the eects of a domestic scal rule on both
electoral budget cycle and yardstick competition. Firstly, we ask whether
there is evidence of such opportunistic behaviour in our local sample; then, we
study the eect of the introduction of a domestic stability pact (DSP) on both
phenomena. The DSP mainly consists in a limit to the budget decit, which
could reduce the incumbent ability to manipulate scal variables, and, as a
consequence, it should make it more dicult to engage in the opportunistic
behaviour.
We conduct an empirical investigation on a panel of Italian municipalities,
from 1994 to 2003. Our analysis focuses on the spending side of the bud-
get, as we consider the possibility that incumbent politicians modify spending
in order to increase their chances to be re-elected. Although the scal rule
targets the whole budget, we do not think restricting the analysis to the ex-
penditure side poses any problem. Indeed, at the local level, politicians do
not have much control over their scal revenues. This is particularly true for
Italian municipalities, where mayors have almost no tax power. The revenue
of municipalities mainly consists of transfers from the central government and
few \local" taxes managed at the central level. Therefore, the opportunistic
behaviour of the incumbent politician can only inuence the expenditure side
of the budget.
1Alesina et al. (1992) and Shi and Svensson (2002) provide evidence of political business
cycle in OECD democratic countries. At the local level empirical evidence of the electoral
cycle has been found by Bhattacharyya and Wassmer (1995), Mouritzen (1989), Galli and
Rossi (2002), Petterson-Lidbom (2003), and Veiga and Veiga (2007). Evidence of yardstick
competition is detected by Allers and Elhorst (2005), Bordignon et al. (2003) and Sol e-Oll e
(2003).
2These works mainly focus on the impact of scal rules on macroeconomic variables (Von
Hagen, 1991; Poterba, 1995; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996).
2Our empirical analysis provides clear evidence of the electoral budget cy-
cle, as current expenditures signicantly increase in the election year. The
introduction of the DSP does not eliminate this opportunistic behaviour, even
though it has a negative impact on the overall level of spending. This suggests
that the DSP is quite eective in controlling the budget of local administra-
tions. A closer look at the behaviour of politicians aected by the DSP, shows
that only the opportunistic behaviour in the pre-electoral year is statistically
signicant. This can be a signal of either a shift of the electoral cycle to
the pre-election year or a smoothing of the opportunistic behaviour over the
pre-election and the election year.
As regards yardstick competition, the analysis shows that municipalities af-
fected by the DSP are more sensitive to changes in scal policies of neighbour-
ing jurisdictions during pre-electoral periods. It seems that the DSP reinforces
the mimicking behaviour of politicians, as it could represent an additional ele-
ment of comparison between neighbouring jurisdictions. For instance, if most
neighbouring jurisdictions comply with the DSP, it could be a signal of bad
performance not to comply with it.
To summarise, although the introduction of the DSP does not eliminate
the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians, it changes the way in
which it is conducted, strengthening the increase of expenditures in the pre-
election year, and the responsiveness to changes in spending of neighbouring
municipalities.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section we give
a brief description of Italian municipalities and scal rules; then, we describe
the data and the methodology used to conduct our empirical investigation; in
section 4, we report estimation results; nally, in section 5, we conclude.
2 Fiscal rules and Italian municipalities
As a consequence of the Stability and Growth Pact, many European countries
have introduced scal rules to limit the expenditures of local administrations.
Fiscal rules usually consist in a limitation to the budget decit and/or a direct
limit to the spending growth rate. In most European countries local scal rules
impose budget balance restrictions (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands). In some of these countries (e.g., Germany and Belgium) scal
rules encompass also a constraint on the expenditure growth rate. In Italy
the law 448/1998 prescribes the implementation of a Domestic Stability Pact
(DSP) which limits the budged decit of local governments from the year 1999
onwards. The scope of the law spans over all levels of the Italian territorial
administrative structure: regions, provinces and municipalities. However, from
the year 2001 municipalities with a population smaller than 5000 inhabitants
were excluded from the DSP. In the year 2002 and from the year 2005 onwards,
there has been an extension of the scope of the DSP, imposing also a limit to
the growth rate of expenditures. However, since our sample ends in 2003, the
3DSP considered in our work mainly consists in a budget decit limitation. In
most EU countries, a violation of such scal rules does not result in a direct
penalty. For instance in Italy, the scal rule is seen as a mean to comply
with the EU stability and growth pact, hence, only if the EU imposes some
sanctions on the State, these are passed on to the local level of government
according to DSP violations3 (Sutherland et al., 2005).
Recent studies on the Italian DSP highlight that only 66% of the munici-
palities fullled the DSP requirements in 1999, the year of the introduction of
the DSP, and that only from the year 2003 the share of municipalities comply-
ing with the DSP rose to 92% (Patrizii et al., 2005). However, we show that
the DSP has lead to a statistically signicant reduction in the expenditure of
the local administrations.
Fiscal rules usually refer to the budget balance, thus the analysis can be
conducted on both expenditure and taxation sides. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, we focus on the level of spending, for Italian municipalities have low
tax autonomy.4 Furthermore, mayors have a substantial power to implement
local policies and are directly accountable for the outcome.5 Therefore, the
opportunistic behaviour is mainly focused on the expenditure side.
3 Data and methodology
The empirical analysis is conducted from 1994 to 2003 using a balanced panel
data on 246 Italian municipalities located in the Marche region. We consider
data on current public expenditures taken from local councils' balance sheets.
The impact of the DSP on the current expenditures is tested by the intro-
duction of a dummy that assumes value 1 when a municipality is subject to
the DSP, and zero otherwise. A negative impact of this dummy on current
spending is expected. In the year 2001, Italian municipalities with a popula-
tion lower than 5000 people have been excluded from the DSP, they represents
27% of our sample.
The presence of electoral competition is investigated using data on election
and pre-election years.6 Public expenditures at the local level are signicantly
aected by the socio-economic and the political characteristics of municipali-
ties (Ermini and Santolini, 2007; Santolini, 2008). To take this into account,
we include data on these socio-economic features in our data set. We consider
population and population density, as a positive impact of both variables on
3In 2005 the rules of the DSP changed, introducing sanctions in case local governments
do not respect the DSP.
4Recently, the government drastically reduced the scope of one of the few taxes (partially)
managed by municipalities: the property tax, namely Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili
(ICI).
5In the year 1992, a reform of the Italian electoral law introduced a majority regime,
where citizens directly vote for their mayor, which led to a concentration of powers (and
responsibilities) on mayors' hands.
6In the period considered there are, on average, three elections in each council.
4current expenditure (i.e., the dependent variable) is consistent with conges-
tion eects while a negative sign denotes economies of scale. Additionally, we
include the percentage of old people (greater or equal than 65 year old), to
account for the possibility that expenditures are driven by social programs for
elderly people. Data on the economic characteristics of the jurisdictions, such
as per-capita income7 and per-capita grants from the central government, are
also considered in the regression analysis. We expect a positive correlation
of both variables with current expenditures. For instance, a positive value
of the coecient associated with income, would be consistent with the Wag-
ner's law, which implies an increase of public expenditures as a consequence
of economic development. We also control for partisan aliation eects, in-
troducing two dummies that assume value 1 when the municipality is ruled
by the left(right)-wing coalition, and zero otherwise. This would account for
the possibility that the expenditure is aected by political ideology. Accord-
ingly, a positive (negative) impact on public expenditure is expected when
the left(right)-wing coalition rules the jurisdiction. Finally, we consider the
impact of large majorities on the opportunistic behaviour. We expect that
politicians elected with a large share of votes have less incentive to increase
expenses, as they face a lower political competition. Summary statistics of the
above-mentioned variables are reported in table 1.
In the regression analysis we consider the logarithm of both dependent
and control variables, to partially remove heteroschedasticity problems which
aect data on current public expenditure of municipalities in the Marche region
(Ermini and Santolini, 2007; Santolini, 2008).
3.1 Dynamic models of electoral budget cycle
A fairly standard model to test for the presence of the electoral budget cycle
is represented by a dynamic specication of current expenditures. We extend
this model by introducing a dummy to account for the eect of the domestic
stability pact (see equation 1).
expit =a + expit 1 + 1electionit + 2prelectionit + DSPit+
+ x
0
it + i + it
(1)
The dependent variable, expit, corresponds to a N 1 vector of cross-sectional
time series observations on current expenditure in municipality i (for i =
1;:::;N) at time period t (for t = 1;:::;T). As regressors we consider the
constant term a, the rst order lagged dependent variable expit 1, the election
year dummy electionit, which accounts for the opportunistic behaviour of the
7Since a panel data of disposable income is not available for Italian municipalities, we
use statistics on the income tax base | Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche (IRPEF).
5incumbent politician during the electoral period. This dummy is a N 1 vec-
tor that assumes value 1 when elections occur at time t, and zero otherwise.
A positive sign of the coecient 1 is expected when the incumbent engages in
electoral budget cycle. According to Rogo (1990), we expect an increase in
public expenditures in the periods before the election. Therefore, we add a pre-
election year dummy, prelectionit, that assumes value 1 when the municipality
is in the pre-election year, and zero otherwise. In order to test the robustness
of our model we follow Mink and De Haan (2005)'s approach, substituting the
election and pre-election dummies with two electoral indexes. These indexes,
developed by Franzese (2000), capture the exact period in which the election
is held. The election indexes are calculated as,
eleindexit =





preleindexit = 1  





where m and d are the month and the day in which the election takes place,
while D is the number of days of m.





it), consisting of: i) population density (i.e., population per
km2); ii) population size; iii) percentage of young people (0-14 year old); iv)
percentage of old people (65 year old); v) per-capita income and pre-capita
grants from the central government. A N 1 vector of municipality eects, i,
is also considered in model 1. Finally, we consider the error term it, which is
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance
2
.
The eect of the scal rule on the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent
politicians is analysed with the interaction term between the DSP and (pre-)
election year dummies, as shown in (2). We expect the introduction of the
DSP would reduce it.
expit =a + expit 1 + 1electionit + 2prelectionit + DSPit+
+ 1electionitDSPit + x
0
it + i + it
(2)
This dynamic panel data model cannot be estimated by the xed-eect (FE)
estimator when T is xed and N goes to innity, as the estimator would be
biased and inconsistent (Verbeek, 2008). A possible solution is the rst dif-
ference estimator developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982). Although
this estimator is easy to implement, it is less ecient than other estimators
based on the generalised method of moments (GMM). In particular, we refer
to the dierence GMM (GMM-DIF) and the system GMM (GMM-SYS) es-
timators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and
6Bond, 1998). Both estimators require the rst-order autocorrelation in the rst
dierenced error term to be dierent than zero. However, their consistency de-
pends on the presence of the second-order autocorrelation in the dierenced
residuals. Both conditions are detected by using specication tests developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991). In the empirical analysis we refer to them as
AB-AR1 test, in the case of rst order autocorrelation analysis, and AB-AR2
test for the second order autocorrelation analysis.
The dynamic model is estimated with the GMM-SYS estimator which is
a combination of a set of standard equations in rst-dierence and equations
in levels, distinctly instrumented. A one-step version of the GMM-SYS esti-
mator, corrected for heteroscedasticity, is adopted because the eciency gains
of using the two-step version is quite small (Bond et al., 2001). The validity
of the set of instruments is detected by the standard Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998),
even though the proliferation of instruments can seriously weaken this test
and overt the endogenous variables (Bowsher, 2002; Roodman, 2007). Fur-
thermore, the validity of the additional set of instruments used in GMM-SYS
estimations is tested by using the Dierence Hansen statistic (Blundell and
Bond, 1998, 2000; Bond et al., 2001).
3.2 Spatial econometric techniques and yardstick competition
In order to consider the eects of the DSP on the opportunistic behaviour
stemming from yardstick competition, we need to apply spatial econometric
techniques (Anselin et al., 2008). Firstly, we estimate the intensity of the
expenditure interaction among neighbouring jurisdictions considering a two-
way xed eect model, with a N  1 vector of time eects, t, as described in
equation (3).
expit = b + 
N X
j=1
wijexpjt + 1electionit + x
0
it + i + t + it (3)
The spatial dimension of the model is captured by the N  N spatial weight
matrix, W, whose elements wij for i 6= j assume value 1 when municipality
j shares a border with municipality i, and zero otherwise. When i = j, we
assume that wij = 0 (Anselin, 1988). Usually, the rows of W are standard-
ised to 1, so that
PN
j=1 wij = 1. When we multiply the elements wij of the
spatial weight matrix by those of the current spending in other municipalities,
i.e.
PN
j=1 wijexpjt, we obtain the average public expenditures of contiguous
municipalities, so that the coecient  measures the intensity of the spending
interaction.
The meaning attached to the coecient , however, is consistent with sev-
eral theories. For instance,  could also be thought of as a measure of spill-over
7eects, or scal competition. Therefore, in order to detect yardstick competi-
tion, we estimate the expenditure interaction among neighbouring municipal-
ities in election and non-election years. According to the yardstick competi-
tion approach (Sol e-Oll e, 2003), incumbent politicians in election year show a
stronger intensity of scal interaction than incumbents not in election year, as
they increase their chances of being re-elected by copy-catting neighbouring
scal policies. Therefore, we modify model (3) introducing two spatial lagged
regimes 1 and 2 as in Allers and Elhorst (2005). The coecients 1 and 2
measure the intensity of the expenditure interaction among municipalities in
election and non-election year, respectively. A positive sign of 1 stands for
strategic complementarity, which can be a signal of yardstick competition only
if 1 is signicantly greater than 2. Since we consider two spatial regimes, the
constant term b is replaced by two complementary intercepts: electionit and








+ '1electionit + '2(1   electionit) + x
0
it + i + t + it
(4)
We also test for the presence of yardstick competition in the pre-electoral
period replacing electionit with prelectionit dummies in (4). We have the same
expectations for the sign and magnitude of 1 and 2, as in the previous model.
The impact of the DSP on yardstick competition is analysed in equation
(5). In detail, we consider the average of current expenditures of municipalities
that, at the same time, are in election year and subject to the DSP, that is
the rst regressor in equation (5). The presence of yardstick competition is
denoted by d
1 > 0 and d
1 > 2. We reach a similar conclusion for munici-
palities in pre-election and non pre-election year by replacing electionit with
prelectionit. On the other hand, the intensity of the expenditure interaction
among municipalities in (pre-)election year but not subjected to the DSP is





















1 eleit(1   DSPit) + '2(1   eleit) + x
0
it + i + t + it
(5)
All spatial empirical models are estimated adopting a feasible ecient two-
step GMM estimator with robust standard errors (Anselin, 1988; Baum et al.,
82003). Since it is a two-stage estimator, is consistent when data suer from
heteroscedasticity and non-normally distributed error terms (Anselin, 1988).
Additionally, it is consistent with the presence of spatial auto-correlated shocks
(Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), thereby the correlation in the level of expit does
not depend on common shocks spatially distributed among jurisdictions (Sol e-
Oll e, 2006).
The average current expenditure of municipalities needs to be instrumented





as suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Similarly, instrumental variables






j wijxit(1   electionit). In (5), it




j wijxitelectionit(1   DSPit),
and
PN
j wijxit(1   electionit) as the set of instruments. Similar instrumental
variables are implemented when the pre-electoral period is considered. Addi-
tional instruments, such as electoral indexes and their average are also taken
into account.
4 Estimation results
This section presents the results of the estimation of our econometric models.
The results of the dynamic model (1), which accounts for the eect of the
DSP on the electoral budget cycle, show that the DSP signicantly reduces the
expenditure of municipalities, the eect ranges between ( 0:07) and ( 0:03),
while the positive and signicant coecient associated with the election year
dummy accounts for the presence of an electoral budget cycle. Therefore,
although the introduction of the DSP reduces public expenditures, it does not
eliminate the electoral budget cycle.
In order to investigate the eect of the DSP on the behaviour of politicians
facing elections, we consider the interaction terms between DSP and (pre-
) election year dummies. As reported in table 2, the interaction between the
DSP and the prelection dummy is positive and signicant, while the interaction
with the election year is not statistically signicant. This suggests that the
introduction of the DSP strengthen the incumbent politicians' opportunistic
behaviour in the pre-election period.
These results are robust to a dierent specication of the electoral and pre-
electoral dummies. We estimate models (1) and (2), substituting the electoral
dummies with two indexes: eleindex and preleindex (Mink and De Haan,
2005). The estimation results are analogous to those presented in table (2),
with respect to the sign and signicance level of the coecients. As regards
control variables, we observe that the coecient of per-capita income and
grants are signicant, and in line with our expectations. Contrary to the
predictions of the political competition literature, we observe a positive and
signicant coecient associated with the majority variable.
We conclude that the introduction of the DSP decreases the size of current
9public expenditure and modify the electoral cycle by inducing an increase of
current spending in the pre-electoral period.
The second part of the analysis considers the presence of yardstick com-
petition. Estimation results are reported in tables 4 and 5. Expenditure
interaction is signicant and occurs with a magnitude of 0:58. In order to
discriminate yardstick competition from other possible causes of interaction,
we interact the neighbouring expenditure with the electoral dummies, accord-
ing to Sol e-Oll e (2003). As shown in table 4, municipalities in (pre-) election
year are more sensitive to neighbouring expenditure levels than municipalities
facing no imminent elections. This evidence is not fully robust, as the p-value
of the dierence between the  coecients in the (pre-) election year, does not
allow us to reject the null hypothesis of identical values.
The eect of the DSP on yardstick competition is shown in table 5, where
we distinguish the eect of the DSP in the electoral and pre-electoral years.
Results show that, in the election year, municipalities aected by the DSP
react less (0.63) than municipalities not aected (0.71), and municipalities
not in election year (0.68). Whereas, in the pre-election year, municipalities
aected by the DSP are more sensitive than the other municipalities (0.73
against 0.68 and 0.63 for municipalities in pre-election year not aected by
the DSP and municipalities not in pre-election year, respectively). This result
suggests that politicians aected by the DSP, in pre-election year, are more
sensitive to changes in scal policies of contiguous municipalities. This is a
robust result, as the -test for the interaction coecients in the pre-election
year, rejects the null hypothesis of identical values.
Summarising, the empirical analysis conducted so far suggests two inter-
esting remarks. Firstly, although the DSP does not eliminate the electoral
cycle, it changes the way in which it is conducted, because the expenditures
increase is strengthen in the pre-election year. This is consistent with both a
shift of the opportunistic behaviour to the pre-election year, or an extension
of the opportunistic behaviour covering both election and pre-election years.
The latter explanation is perhaps more consistent with the Italian context, as
the DSP introduces a link between past and present budget which forces in-
cumbent politicians to smooth the opportunistic behaviour over a wider time
span.
Secondly, as regards political yardstick competition, we nd that munici-
palities aected by the DSP are more sensitive to changes in scal policies of
neighbouring jurisdictions during pre-electoral periods. It seems that the DSP
reinforces the mimicking behaviour of politicians, as it could represent an ad-
ditional element of comparison between contiguous jurisdictions. For instance,
if neighbouring jurisdictions comply with the DSP, it would be a bad signal
for the incumbent politician not to do so.
105 Conclusions
The empirical analysis conducted on the behaviour of incumbent politicians in
the Marche region, leads to three main results. Firstly, the DSP signicantly
reduces the expenditure of municipalities. Secondly, our analysis shows that
the DSP does not eliminate the electoral budget cycle, rather it induces a
change in the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians. Thirdly, as
regards yardstick competition, we show that incumbent politicians react to
the introduction of the DSP by strengthening their response to changes in

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Table 2: Estimation results of the electoral budget cycle and DSP eects
Model





























































































































































AB-AR1 test 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
AB-AR2 test 0.121 0.288 0.763 0.847 0.593 0.517
Hansen J test 0.138 0.235 0.230 0.479 0.538 0.369
Hansen-dierence test 0.342 0.686 0.092 0.402 0.812 0.453
Note: i) instruments for rst dierences equation are expi(t 4), population; ii) instruments for
levels equation are the constant term, the second order dierence of expi(t 1), and population;
iii) the results of the tests are in p-value; iv) coecient signicant at level *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%;
v) z-value in parenthesis; vi) observations: 2214.
13Table 3: Estimation results using the electoral indexes
Model













































































































AB-AR1 test 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002
AB-AR2 test 0.080 0.283 0.917 0.478
Hansen J test 0.095 0.226 0.459 0.300
Hansen-dierence test 0.304 0.697 0.430 0.472
Note: i) instruments for rst dierences equation are expi(t 4),
population; ii) instruments for levels equation are the constant term,
the second order dierence of expi(t 1), and population; iii) the results of
the tests are in p-value; iv) coecient signicant at level *** 1%, ** 5%,
*10%; v) z-value in parenthesis; vi) observations: 2214.





















































































Centred R2 0.94 0.97 0.97
Hansen J test 0.407 0.362 0.158
 test = 0 0.488 0.179
' test = 0 0.466 0.173
Note: i) instrument variables in model 3 are the regressors and their average;
ii) instrument variables in model 4 are the regressors, the regressors average
interacted with the electoral (pre-electoral) dummies, the election index, the
pre-election index, and the average of the election index; iii) results of the
tests are in p-value; iv) coecient signicant at level *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; v)
z-value in parenthesis; vi) observations: 2460.
15Table 5: Eects of the DSP on yardstick competition
Model
(5) (5)
Neigh Exp*Election *DSP 0.63***
(7.18)
Neigh Exp*Election * No DSP 0.71***
(8.53)




Neigh Exp*Prelection* No DSP 0.68***
(7.29)























































Hansen J test 0.211 0.107
 test = 0 0.210 0.093*
' test = 0 0.179 0.088*
Note: i) instrument variables in model 5 are the regressors, the regressors average
interacted with the electoral (pre-electoral) dummies and the DSP dummy, the election
index, the pre-election index, and the average of the election index; ii) results of the
tests are in p-value; iii) coecient signicant at level *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; iv) z-value
in parenthesis; v) observations: 2460.
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